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ABSTRACT
A number of recent works have demonstrated that API access to
machine learning models leaks information about the dataset records
used to train the models. Further, the work of [9] shows that such
membership inference attacks (MIAs) may be sufficient to construct
a stronger breed of attribute inference attacks (AIAs), which given
a partial view of a record can guess the missing attributes. In this
work, we show (to the contrary) that MIA may not be sufficient
to build a successful AIA. This is because the latter requires the
ability to distinguish between similar records (differing only in a
few attributes), and, as we demonstrate, the current breed of MIA
are unsuccessful in distinguishing member records from similar non-
member records. We thus propose a relaxed notion of AIA, whose
goal is to only approximately guess the missing attributes and argue
that such an attack is more likely to be successful, if MIA is to be
used as a subroutine for inferring training record attributes.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The introduction of low-cost machine learning APIs from Google,
Microsoft, Amazon, IBM, etc., has enabled many companies to mon-
etize advanced machine learning models trained on private datasets
by exposing them as a service. This has also caught the interest of
the privacy community who has shown that these models may leak
information about the records of the training dataset via membership
inference attacks (MIA). In MIA, the adversary (a user of the ser-
vice) may have simple black-box access to these models, submitting
inputs (records) and obtaining outputs (class labels and probabil-
ity/confidence for each label), can infer whether its target input was
part of the training dataset or not. This can be a serious privacy
breach when the underlying dataset is sensitive, e.g., medical data.
The main reason for the success of an MIA is attributed to the
observation that machine learning algorithms tend to return higher
confidence scores for examples that they have seen (i.e., records
in the training dataset) versus those that they encounter for the
first time [4, 5]. Overfitted models are shown to be more prone to
MIA [5, 9], although the attack has also been observed on well-
generalized models [2]. It has also been observed that the attack’s
success rate varies on different sub-groups of the training dataset [7].
Some researchers have also investigated a related, and perhaps a
more likely attack in practice, where the adversary only knows a par-
tial record of a target in the training dataset and seeks to complete its
knowledge of the missing attributes by accessing the machine learn-
ing model. This is known as the Attribute Inference Attack (AIA) [9].
Samuel et al. [9] provide a formal definition of an AIA, and argue
that an attribute inference adversary can infer the missing attribute
value by using a membership inference adversary as a subroutine.
Slightly more precisely, for a missing attribute with t possible values,
the AI adversary constructs t different input (feature) vectors, gives
them as input to the MI adversary, and outputs the attribute value
which corresponds to the output from the MI adversary with the
highest confidence [9, §5, p. 277].
While this appears to be a straightforward result, in this paper we
show that it is not true in practice. More specifically, we hypothe-
size and experimentally validate that an MI adversary is unable to
effectively distinguish between a member of the training dataset and
any non-members that are close to the member according to some
distance metric. This has implications for attribute inference, since
the AI adversary would like to confidently infer the missing attribute
value of its target record (who is assumed to be a member of the
training dataset) by distinguishing it from other values (which result
in vectors which are non-members). Thus, while machine learning
algorithms output higher confidence for examples that are part of the
training dataset, they also similarly return higher confidence scores
for examples that are similar to the training examples. Summary of
our main contributions follow.
• We propose the notion of strong membership inference in
which the adversary is asked to distinguish between two input
vectors (records) which are a certain distance apart from each
other (according to a given distance metric), where exactly
one of the two is a member. We hypothesize and experi-
mentally validate that as long as the vectors are close, the
adversary’s advantage is not significantly better than random
guess, and the advantage improves as the distance between
the vectors increases. Since this implies that an attribute in-
ference adversary is unlikely to succeed (if the number of
missing attributes are small), we propose an alternative defi-
nition of approximate attribute inference, where the goal of
the adversary is to output a nearby (complete) vector to the
target vector.
• We train neural network target models for MIA on the datasets
of Location-30, and Purchases-2,10,20,50,100. The aim is
to see if the confidence values between members and non-
members can be distinguished. We replicate MIA accura-
cies reported in literature, and show that where MIA per-
forms well, typically, the non-members (in the test datasets)
ar
X
iv
:1
90
8.
10
55
8v
2 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
2 O
ct 
20
19
PPML’19, November 2019, London, GB Benjamin Zi Hao Zhao, Hassan Jameel Asghar, Raghav Bhaskar, and Mohamed Ali Kaafar
have high Hamming distance from the nearest members. We
then interpolate this by generating synthetic generated non-
members (controlling the Hamming distance from members),
and show that the accuracy of the distinguisher is similar to a
random guess for vectors close to any member of the training
set, while the accuracy grows as we move away from (any)
members.
We remark that our definitions and experiments do not take the
class labels into account (instead relying on the largest confidence
value only). As a result, our attribute inference attack is not an in-
stance of model inversion [1], which in essence relies on the correla-
tion between attributes in the training dataset and the (learned) class
label. A more detailed discussion on the merits of model inversion
and similar attacks can be found in [5].
2 DEFINITIONS, MEMBERSHIP AND
ATTRIBUTE INFERENCE
Notations. A machine learning model f takes as input feature vec-
tors x ∈ Rm (of m elements/features) and outputs a label vector
y ∈ R∗, whose ith element denotes the confidence (or probability)
score for the ith class label. We denote by P the distribution induced
by feature vectors x on Rm . This captures the a priori belief about
the feature space. A training dataset D is a multiset of feature vectors
from Rm . In general, the rows of D may be sampled according to
some distribution other than P. The notation a ←D A indicates
sampling an element a from some set A with some distribution D.
The symbol ‘$’ denotes uniform distribution. We denote by fD , the
model f trained on the training dataset D.
Distance, Neighbors and Portions. Let d be a metric on Rm . For
x ∈ Rm , the set ngbr (x) denotes the set of all r -neighbors of x,
i.e., vectors x′ such that d(x, x′) = r , for a real number r > 0.
The distance of a vector x′ ∈ Rm from a dataset D is defined as
minx∈D d(x, x′). For a vector x, a portion of x, denoted x∗, is a
vector which has at least one feature of x replaced with ∗. The set
of features which are starred in x∗ is known as the unknown part
of x∗. We denote this as ϕ(x∗). Each feature in ϕ(x∗) is called an
unknown feature. Without loss of generality we will assume that the
unknown part of x∗ consists of the last |ϕ(x∗)| features. Throughout
the rest of this paper, with a focus on binary datasets, we shall use
the Hamming distance as the instance of the distance metric d.
Membership and Attribute Inference. We begin with the defini-
tion of membership inference derived from [9].
Definition 1 (Membership Inference). Let A be the adversary.
(1) Construct model fD and give A oracle access to it.
(2) Sample b ←$ {0, 1}.
(3) Sample x←$ D if b = 0, else sample x←P Rm .
(4) A receives x and continues to make oracle queries to fD .
(5) A announces b ′ ∈ {0, 1}. If b ′ = b, output 1, else output 0.
Notice that unlike in [9], we do not necessarily assume that all
the members of D are sampled from the same distribution P. Thus,
in the above definition, the adversary can possibly gain an advantage
in distinguishing a member of the dataset because of its distance
from the “typical population member.” We also propose a stronger
definition below, where the adversary is asked to distinguish between
a random member from the dataset and a non-member similar to the
member. Such a strong inference attacker, as we show later, has a
better chance of inferring missing attributes of a feature vector and
violating privacy of individuals in the dataset even when they share
“similar” features.
Definition 2 (Strong Membership Inference). Let A be the adver-
sary, and let r > 0 be a real number.
(1) Construct model fD and give A oracle access to it.
(2) Sample x0 ←$ D, and x1 ←$ ngbr (x0) \ D.
(3) A receives x0 and x1 (after shuffling), and continues to make
oracle queries to fD .
(4) A announces x′. If x′ = x0, output 1, else output 0.
The above definition challenges the adversary to distinguish be-
tween two neighbouring feature vectors. The closeness of the two
vectors is controlled by the parameter r in the definition. We show
in Section 3 why such a strong inference attacker is a better starting
point for constructing an attribute inference attacker in the spirit of
[9]. Next, we present an adapted definition of the attribute inference
attacker from [9].
Definition 3 (Attribute Inference). Let A denote the adversary, and
let |ϕ(x∗)| =m′ ≥ 1.
(1) Construct model fD and give A oracle access to it.
(2) Sample b ←$ {0, 1}.
(3) Sample x←$ D if b = 0, else sample x←P Rm .
(4) Let x∗ be the portion of x such that |ϕ(x∗)| =m′.
(5) A receives x∗ and continues to make oracle queries to fD .
(6) A announces x′ ∈ Rm . If x′ = x output 1, else output 0.
The attribute inference advantage of the adversary is the prob-
ability that the experiment outputs 1 when b = 0 (member of the
dataset) minus the probability that the experiment outputs 1 when
b = 1 (random vector from the population). The above definition
mirrors the one from [9], except that we do not take the class label
into account. Our experiments in Section 3 show that constructing
an attacker that can exactly predict the missing values of a portion of
a member vector with high probability is highly unlikely. Thus, we
propose below the definition of an approximate AIA, that requires
the attacker to predict the missing values only “approximately close”
to a member vector.
Definition 4 (Approximate Attribute Inference). Let A denote the
adversary, let |ϕ(x∗)| =m′ ≥ 1, let α ≥ 0 be a distance parameter.
(1) Construct model fD and give A oracle access to it.
(2) Sample b ←$ {0, 1}.
(3) Sample x←$ D if b = 0, else sample x←P Rm .
(4) Let x∗ be the portion of x such that |ϕ(x∗)| =m′.
(5) A receives x∗ and continues to make oracle queries to fD .
(6) A announces x′ ∈ Rm . If d(x′, x) ≤ α output 1, else 0.
The attribute inference advantage of the adversary is defined
analogously to the previous definition.
3 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Setup. We adopt MIA from Salem et al. [4] which directly ex-
ploits the maximum confidence score returned by the model for
a given input vector. The confidence score is compared against a
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previously learned threshold and the input is deemed a member or
a non-member accordingly. We use two datasets for the evaluation
of the attacks: a social network locations check-in dataset obtain
from Foursquare (Location) [8] and a Shopping transactions dataset
(Purchase).1 Both datasets have been used previously to demonstrate
MIA [4, 5]. The datasets are binary, with 467 binary features in
Location and 699 in Purchase. The class labels in both the Loca-
tion and Purchase datasets are obtained through k-means clustering.
There are 30 classes in the Location dataset, and 5 variants of the
Purchase dataset differing in the number of classes (2, 10, 20, 50,
100) as is done in [4]. For attack success, we report the Area Under
the ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) Curve (AUC) which
is obtained by varying the threshold between extremes. The AUCs
are obtained by sampling up to 10,000 vectors from the dataset (Our
location dataset only contains 6,951 vectors in total, whilst the pur-
chase dataset contains a total of 200,000 vectors), then splitting the
dataset into 20/80 for training/testing respectively. From the training
and testing sets, we sample 1000 vectors each to create member and
non-member sets, respectively. These subsamples are evaluated by
the target model for maximum confidence values, which are used to
compute the AUC. The target model is trained locally with Tensor-
flow Estimators2 as a fully connected neural network with 5 hidden
layers of [1024, 1024, 512, 512, 512] nodes for all Purchase datasets,
and [512, 512, 512, 512, 512] nodes for Location. This configuration
reproduces MIA AUCs reported in [4]: we obtained AUCs averaged
over 50 iterations as 0.872 for Location-30, and 0.548, 0.628, 0.671,
0.745, 0.794 for Purchase-2, 10, 20, 50, 100 respectively. These
illustrate membership inference as per Definition 1.
In the following, we first show that the Hamming distance of
non-members from every vector of the training dataset in the above
experiments is considerably large, owing to the success of MIA.
We then construct synthetic non-members by changing the (binary)
feature values to control the Hamming distance from the training
dataset, and show that if the Hamming distance is low, the AUCs
are close to random guess (0.5) and only improve as the Hamming
distance increases. We follow this up with implications to attribute
inference (Definition 3), and evaluate the performance of the approx-
imate attribute inference attack (Definition 4).
MIA Performance on the Testing Set. After training the target
model, we compute the Hamming distance of each non-member
vector from the training set (recall from Section 2 that this is the
minimum Hamming distance from any member). The vectors are
then grouped according to the Hamming distances from the training
dataset (note that the Hamming distance is 0 for members). We then
calculate AUC for each Hamming distance grouping. This test is
repeated 50 times, and the AUC is computed on the aggregation of
all confidence values (Figure 1). For the Location dataset, as hypoth-
esized, the AUC is close to random guess (0.5) for non-members
close to the training dataset, and starts improving as we shift away.
This trend is also visible for the Purchase datasets, although less so.
This is because for the Purchase dataset the non-members are farther
away from the training dataset. This shows that strong membership
1https://www.kaggle.com/c/acquire-valued-shoppers-challenge/data
2https://www.tensorflow.org/guide/estimators
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Figure 1: Increasing AUC of MIA with increasing Hamming
distance of actual non-members from the training dataset.
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Figure 2: Histogram of Hamming distances of non-members
from different training datasets.
inference (Definition 2) is less successful than the reported high
accuracy of MI that falls under Definition 1.
The lack of vectors close to and farthest away from the training
dataset is due to the distribution of Hamming distances displayed in
Figure 2. As the non-members within the original Purchases dataset
do not provide a full picture of how the AUC, and hence MIA
performance, changes at small Hamming distances from members,
we generate artificial vectors.
MIA Performance on Synthetic Vectors Close to Members. To
generate new vectors, we (a) randomly select a member of the train-
ing set, and (b) randomly select features to invert. We vary features
until a minimum number of variants (5) are produced for each Ham-
ming distance group. This is repeated for all selected 1000 member
vectors. The vectors thus generated are non-members (unless, by
chance, any of them collides with a member, in which case we dis-
card it). We then compute the AUC of MIA displayed in Figure
3. As can be seen, the AUC is close to 0.5 for non-members close
to the training dataset, and starts improving as the distance from
training dataset increases. Also, the higher the number of classes,
the steeper the improvement in AUC as the Hamming distance in-
creases. Interestingly, in the Purchase datasets, for smaller number of
classes (2, 10 and 20), we observe an increase an AUC, followed by
a decrease. For the 10 and 20 class variant, we see a second incline
around a Hamming distance of 250. We see the same trend in the
Location dataset but at different Hamming distance of 300. This may
be related to the distribution of non-member vectors in the original
dataset. We plan to investigate this in the future.
Attribute Inference. The above results indicate that if an adversary
has a portion x∗ of a feature vector x with a single unknown feature
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Figure 3: Increasing AUC of MIA with increasing Hamming
distance of synthetic non-members from the training dataset.
having value b in the training dataset, then it is difficult to distinguish
between the (member) vector x = (x∗,b) and (x∗,b). Similarly, if
the unknown part of x∗ is bigger, say 15 unknown features, and only
one vector x exists in the training dataset with the portion x∗, then
it is difficult to distinguish between x and vectors close to x having
the same portion. We demonstrate this with the location dataset in
Figure 4, which shows the distribution of confidence values with
respect to Hamming distances from member vectors. Confidence
values of non-member vectors that are a small Hamming distance
away from member vectors are almost equally likely to be higher or
lower than those of member vectors. It is due to this reason that we
propose a relaxed version of attribute inference (Definition 4) where
we allow the adversary to guess a vector close to the target vector.
Next we analyze the performance of this approximate AI attack.
To give attribute inference the highest likelihood of success, we
use the 15 most important features as the unknown part of x∗, ranked
according to the minimal-redundancy-maximal-relevance (mRMR)
criteria [3]. A feature with the highest mRMR ranking should statisti-
cally contribute the most information about the class label, and hence
should observe the largest deviations in prediction confidences. For
each target member in the training dataset, the approximate AI attack
algorithm generates all possible permutations of the 15 unknown
features (only one of which corresponds to the original vector x).
The algorithm then returns the vector with the highest confidence
value as its guess for the target vector (and hence the missing at-
tributes). We test this on the Location dataset and plot the results
in Figure 5. The plot shows the distribution of Hamming distances
of the outputs of the attack to the member vectors. In the case of a
tie (multiple vectors yielding the same maximum confidence score),
we report the average Hamming distance of the tied vectors to the
member vector. Randomly guessing the unknown part would result
in a mean Hamming distance of 7.5. The plot shows that the attribute
inference attack performs considerably better with a mean distance
of approximately 6.5, with the bulk of the distribution being closer
to member vector.
4 RELATED WORK
Many privacy researchers have identified the issue of membership
inference in machine learning models. Shokri et al. [5] propose
the idea of constructing shadow models which mimic the unknown
training datasets to launch an MIA. This technique is based on a
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related observation to ours that machine learning models trained on
similar data behave similarly. One method to generate data similar to
the training dataset in [5] is to flip 10 to 20% of the (binary) features
in the dataset. Salem et al. [4] simplify MIA by dropping the need
for constructing (the rather expensive) shadow models. In particular,
they demonstrate that the difference in confidence scores between
members and non-members is enough to distinguish them. Indeed,
we have adopted this attack to demonstrate the relationship between
membership and attribute inference, and the distance from member
vectors. Both works have used a split of a real dataset into training
and testing sets, and demonstrated the effectiveness of MIA using
the testing sets. We have shown that most vectors in the testing set,
i.e., non-members, are expected to be far from the training set, which
explains why the relationship of MIA to distance from members was
not identified in these works.
Somesh et al. [9] formally relate overfitting to the effectiveness
of MIA, a link which was previously experimentally identified and
demonstrated in [4, 5]. They also formally define attribute infer-
ence (which is the basis for our related definition). However, their
definition as well as experimental evaluation of attribute inference
uses the class label as well. An interesting area of future research
is to see how inclusion of class label in our strong membership and
approximate attribute inference definitions influence the result. A
related attack on machine learning models is model extraction [6],
through which unknown parameters of the model are retrieved to
construct similarly behaving models (hence stealing the model in a
proprietary sense). These attacks are applicable to the entire model
itself and not necessarily related to individuals in the training dataset.
Related to above is the question whether MIA can identify biases in
the training datasets. This has been demonstrated in [7], in which the
authors show that even if MIA is ineffective as a whole on a dataset,
it has disparate effectiveness on different sub-groups in the dataset.
This in turn reveals some information about the distribution of the
underlying dataset. In some sense the shadow model technique also
On Inferring Training Data Attributes in Machine Learning Models PPML’19, November 2019, London, GB
relies on the fact that machine learning models may not be able to
suppress some characteristics of the dataset (such as its overall dis-
tribution). We have defined Definition 1 and 3 such that the attacker
may be able to distinguish between a member and a non-member
via the bias in the training dataset distribution; which, depending on
the application, may be construed as a privacy violation.
5 FUTURE WORK
We plan to further refine the inference definitions, investigate algo-
rithmic approaches to infer attributes in the weak attribute inference
model, and analyze the effect of over-fitting on the results. We would
also like to see whether these results are replicated by other classi-
fiers, and by other (non-binary) datasets. With non-binary datasets,
our definition will be expanded to explore other distance metrics
such as Euclidean distance. We will also investigate if attribute in-
ference can be performed as a standalone attack, i.e., without using
membership inference as a subroutine.
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